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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

L. K. White

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL

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\* ☐ Red's comments make sense to me. Let's do as he suggests in the last sentence.

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DD/S&T#497-72

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2 February 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Discussion paper: "Science, Technology, and Change:  
Implications for the Central Intelligence Agency"

25X1 I have read [ ] paper on "Science, Technology, and Change." The answer to the question of how to organize is quite different in CIA from the military services and possibly even industry. In the military, rotation of key personnel is frequent. The whole scheme of things is geared to training large numbers of personnel to command the same kinds of organizations. When a new commander arrives, he knows exactly how the unit is organized and what training and qualifications he has among his personnel. He really can't change it very much. He also has very little to say about who the people occupying the key posts will be. They come and go on orders from above to command organizations for which they have been trained. The commander, of course, imposes his own style of leadership and can within limitations reassign personnel within his unit. In a very real sense however, he has no choice but to conform to the organization. Hence, organization is extremely important.

In CIA, the situation is just the opposite. Without a doubt the people dominate and the organization conforms. Here it is hard to find "the organization man." We don't have the rotational program to cope with. Our organization, therefore, can be - and is - informal in the extreme. We can, however, quickly put together a good team to solve a problem that cuts across organization lines. This is the reason why I think pragmatism has properly characterized our approach to organization and I am inclined to think that it should in the future. It is relatively simple if you are starting from scratch to set up a new organization, putting like things together, etc. (It starts getting complicated only when you begin to put people in the organization boxes.) It is quite another to change an existing, and especially a successful, organization where all the boxes are filled with competent, hard-charging people. One just can't ignore where he is today and how he got there.

The foregoing is not meant to imply that organization isn't important. It is - but of secondary importance to the people. Nor is it meant to imply that nothing should change. It must. An "as is"

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philosophy of management will be fatal. Everything about us is changing and so must we. The question is how and when. I don't find a very good answer in the [redacted] paper and I certainly don't have one.

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[redacted] is more specific about what is wrong organizationally with our research, development, testing and engineering program. About this, he may well be right. Our several efforts to effect authoritative coordination of our total program have not been very successful. Today, we've just about gone full circle with each of the four Directorates fighting for its share of the funds, carrying out its own program, in accordance with its own priorities, etc., a game in which the Executive Director-Comptroller is the referee. We have no list of Agency-wide priorities and I am not sure that we are getting the maximum out of this [redacted] program. I do think that [redacted] paper might form the basis for a most interesting and hopefully productive discussion at your Planning Conference if sufficient work is done in advance to prepare for it.

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[redacted]

L. K. White

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4 February 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

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1. As I indicated in very sketchy fashion, I find this a most stimulating survey, although it by no means provides all the answers. I think it is particularly effective in its stress on the present acceleration of the intelligence process and the enormous quantitative explosion we face. I would say that this is compounded by the new multipolar world we will face in coming years. In this light, I think [redacted] stress on the need for new techniques of analysis and the mechanization of many of our processes is well taken, as the yellow pad and pencil alone really won't be enough to handle the problems of the future.

2. I see the need for R&D of this nature not only in analysis but also in collection (including espionage as well as technical), operational support, information processing and retrieval, and of course internal management. I have the same visceral repugnance that many have to the term "systems analysis," but I think we will have to speed up our ways to consider the alternatives on complicated problems in the future through the use of technology. The technology can't give us the answers, but it frequently can help us to see the alternatives and can pose questions we might not have noted for ultimate resolution by the ever-necessary gray indentations of the human brain.

3. On the organizational implication, I think the paper is somewhat weaker. Kaleidoscopic or even psychedelic organizational forms would in my opinion be more destabilizing than helpful in reacting to new problems. On the other hand, we all agree that we must not be frozen into the organizational rigidities of the past. The task force idea is certainly appropriate, and so are some of the various working groups and boards that have been established on an ad hoc basis. With respect to R&D, I have in process a proposal to take a new look at the way we are organized for R&D, which I will shortly be offering for the review and comment of the Deputies before submitting it to you.

4. I concur with Colonel White that the modernization of the Agency is well worth the attention of you and the Deputies at your

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annual conference. I believe, however, that we might be able to refine a few specific aspects of the problem for a more detailed examination within the overall context. I will put this on our tentative agenda and see what I can come up with in terms of specifics for further discussion.

[Redacted Signature]

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W. E. Colby  
Executive Director-Comptroller

Attachments:

- A. Memo for DCI from L. K. White dtd 2 Feb 72,  
Subj: Discussion Paper: "Science, Technology, and  
Change: Implications for the Central Intelligence Agency"
- B. Memo to DCI from DD/S&T dtd 28 Jan 72, Same Subject  
w/ [Redacted] Paper

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